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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, solar energy has gained in popularity in the United States. 
Solar energy proponents point out that solar energy is the cleanest source of 
electricity: it does not require vast spaces of land or the damming of natural rivers, 
and it does not emit carbon dioxide.1 The Obama Administration has also publicly 
supported solar energy. In 2010, the Obama Administration announced its plan to 
install solar panels on the White House roof.2 Six years later, President Barack 
Obama acknowledged the significant progress of solar energy in his final State of 
the Union Address.3 
The numbers tend to show the popularity of solar technologies. According to 
the U.S. Department of Energy, solar installations have grown seventeen-fold since 
2008.4 Moreover, the current cumulative solar electric capacity in the U.S. has 
exceeded 22,700 Megawatts (MW).5 No one denies the progress of solar 
technologies. However, the question remains whether these technologies indeed are 
“saving Americans tens of millions of dollars a year on their energy bills,” as 
President Obama claimed in his State of the Union Address.6 Several publications 
recently questioned the efficiency of current alternative energy programs.7 They have 
focused on the free riding problem, where the cost of solar panels is shifted from 
those who reap the benefits to third persons, including low-income population.8 
The above problem is not uncommon in Pennsylvania: economically 
disadvantaged groups end up absorbing the costs of someone else’s solar panels.9 
                                                          
1 K.K. DuVivier, Solar Skyspace B, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 389, 389–90 (2014). 
2 Genevieve Coyle, Comment, The Not-So-Green Renewable Energy: Preventing Waste Disposal 
of Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Panels, 4 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 329, 329 (2011). 
3 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.whitehouse/ 
.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-%E2%80%93-prepared-delivery-
state-union-address [hereinafter State of the Union Address]. 
4 OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, SOLAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES, 
http://energy.gov/eere/solarpoweringamerica/solar-energy-united-states (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
5 Solar Industry Data, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/research-
resources/solar-industry-data (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
6 State of the Union Address, supra note 3. 
7 See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
8 See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
9 See infra Part II.B. 
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Specifically, the Pennsylvania legislature imposes certain minimum quantities of 
solar energy that state electric distribution companies are obligated to buy and supply 
to their customers.10 Electric companies incur additional costs in complying with this 
requirement, which they pass along to their customers.11 Despite some recent 
evidence that solar energy is inefficient in Pennsylvania,12 Pennsylvania authorities 
continue to enforce this requirement. This paper argues that mandatory quotas for 
solar technologies in Pennsylvania are not an effective solution to developing 
renewable energy resources in Pennsylvania. In combination with net metering, solar 
quotas are resulting in subsidizing the owners of solar panels at the expense of low-
income people.13 Part I will provide a historic development of the national energy 
regulation to put the solar regulation in the context. Part II will describe the current 
energy regulatory regime in Pennsylvania. It will address the statute that introduced 
retail competition in Pennsylvania, Act 129 on energy-efficiency, and Alternative 
Energy Portfolio Standard Act that specifically imposes solar quotas. Part III will 
discuss the negative implications of solar programs nationwide, and analyze 
Pennsylvania solar initiatives to come to the conclusion that the current regulatory 
regime should be modified to address cross-subsidizing and free-riding. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY INDUSTRY: FROM 
MONOPOLISM TO DEREGULATION 
The energy market of the United States was built on the principles of 
monopolism for many years.14 This was mainly attributed to the high dependence of 
the energy industry on the infrastructure—once one electric company established its 
distribution system, the second company on the market had to create its own 
distribution system, which entailed high costs.15 As a result, vertically integrated 
utility companies controlled all stages of energy production: generation, 
transmission, and distribution.16 Moreover, they were granted geographic monopoly 
to serve all customers within a specific location.17 The U.S. government, in 
exchange, subjected electric companies to extensive regulation, turning electric 
                                                          
10 See infra Part II.C. 
11 See infra Part III.B.2. 
12 See infra Part III.B.1. 
13 See infra Part III.B.2. 
14 Trevor D. Stiles, Regulatory Barriers to Clean Energy, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 926 (2010). 
15 Id. at 926–27. 
16 Id. at 927. 
17 Id. 
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companies into highly regulated public utility companies.18 Specifically, electric 
companies were obligated to provide service to every customer within the company’s 
service area on a non-discriminatory basis.19 In addition, federal government had 
authority to approve the rates electric companies charged.20 
Vertically integrated electric public utility companies lasted until the 1970s 
energy crisis, when the biggest oil exporters introduced an embargo on all oil 
supplies to Western nations, resulting in a tremendous increase in oil and gas prices.21 
In an attempt to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil and develop alternative 
energy resources, President Jimmy Carter introduced the National Energy Act of 
1978.22 Its key element, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), 
required electric companies to procure a portion of the electricity from “qualified 
facilities”—small generation sources of alternative energy.23 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was put in charge of the 
PURPA implementation.24 Specifically, the FERC promulgated regulations setting a 
minimum price for the energy procurement from such generation sources.25 Under 
these regulations, electric companies were to buy energy from the qualified facilities 
at the price charged to the companies’ own customers.26 Because small generation 
sources of alternative energy could not get such high prices before the PURPA, the 
new regime was a significant step to encourage renewable sources of energy 
throughout the United States.27 
In the 1990s, the energy market went through a period of “deregulation.”28 
Deregulation meant the “unbundling” of electric utility rates, i.e., separating 
                                                          
18 See Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government Regulation, 33 
TULSA L.J. 827, 831 (1998). 
19 Id. at 841. 
20 Id. at 831. 
21 Id. at 834. 
22 Id. 
23 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). 
24 Tomain, supra note 18, at 835. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Inara Scott, “Dancing Backward in High Heels”: Examining and Addressing the Disparate 
Regulatory Treatment of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Resources, 43 ENVTL. L. 255, 263 (2013). 
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customer charges for generation, transmission and distribution.29 Specifically, these 
changes stemmed from the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPA)30 and FERC Order No. 
888.31 Order No. 888 required two important mandates from electric companies: 
(1) to unbundle the wholesale transmission from generation, and (2) to “provide 
open access to their transmission lines.”32 This meant that all generation facilities 
could compete on the open market to sell their energy to utility transmission and 
distribution companies.33 However, these sales still did not reach ordinary customers 
because FERC did not have jurisdiction to regulate retail competition.34 In addition, 
state utility commissions that had the authority to regulate retail hesitated, for various 
reasons, to introduce retail competition on the energy generation market.35 
Consequently, the federal government took a few steps to encourage the use of 
alternative energy sources by requiring the electric companies to buy renewable 
energy from the qualified sources and by letting generation facilities that produced 
energy from renewable sources to compete on the open market.36 
In the mid-1990s, several states followed the federal trend of deregulating the 
energy market and authorized retail competition.37 Under this new regime, 
residential and industrial electricity consumers were able to choose the type of 
generation source as their energy supplier.38 States, however, went farther and 
introduced renewable portfolio standards.39 Many of these standards required 
investor-owned electric utility companies to purchase certain amounts of energy 
                                                          
29 Id.; Stiles, supra note 14. 
30 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
31 Scott, supra note 28; Stiles, supra note 14, at 928. 
32 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 295 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(referring to Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services By Public Utilities, 18 C.F.R. § 35 (1996)). 
33 David Schraub, Renewing Electricity Competition, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 957 (2015) 
(“[T]he pricing and usage of the transmission lines had to be ‘unbundled’ from other non-retail utility 
services, preventing self-dealing and other anti-competitive practices meant to favor the incumbent 
owners.”). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 958–59. 
36 Michael Coyn Mateer, Note, When the Lights Go Out: The Impact of House Bill 6 on Regional 
Transmission Organizations and the Reliability of the Power Grid, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 775, 787 
(2003–04). 
37 Schraub, supra note 33, at 960. 
38 Id. 
39 Report of the Renewable Energy Committee, 29 ENERGY L.J. 269, 270 (2008). 
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from alternative sources.40 Consequently, the last decade of the 20th century was 
marked with significant transformations of the energy market. Energy generation 
business was de-monopolized and renewable energy received strong incentives from 
both federal and state government.41 
II. PENNSYLVANIA ENERGY REGULATION 
Pennsylvania followed the national trend to deregulate energy market and 
promote energy efficiency and renewable energy. In particular, the Pennsylvania 
legislature enacted the Electricity Generation Choice and Competition Act, including 
Act 129,42 and the Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard Act.43 
A. Pennsylvania Unbundling 
Following FERC Order 888, Pennsylvania enacted its own legislation that 
required the unbundling of utility rates—the Electricity Generation Customer Choice 
and Competition Act.44 While the statute did not prohibit regulated electric utility 
companies from owning and operating generation facilities,45 it prevented them from 
including expenses relating to generation facilities in their rate base.46 Since 
regulated electric utility companies received their revenues from the sales of 
electricity to their customers charged at a pre-approved rate by the Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission (PA PUC),47 the companies had no incentive to keep any 
generation sources in their system.48 Electric utility companies could still recover the 
costs relating to generation facilities through selling generated energy on the open 
wholesale market.49 The companies could, thus, maintain the generation side of the 
                                                          
40 Id. 
41 Scott, supra note 28, at 272–73. 
42 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2801 (2008). 
43 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1648.1 (2008). 
44 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2801 (1996). 
45 Id. § 2804(5) (“The commission may permit, but shall not require, an electric utility to divest 
itself of facilities or to reorganize its corporate structure.”). 
46 Id. § 2807. 
47 Sandra Levine & Katie Kendall, Energy Efficiency and Conservation: Opportunities, Obstacles, 
and Experiences, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 101, 104 (2007). 
48 For a discussion of how such a regime affected the alternative energy market in Pennsylvania, 
see infra Part III.B. 
49 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2807(e)(5)(ii) (1996). 
 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XVI – Spring 2016 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2016.190 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214 
energy business unburdened by PA PUC regulation, but they no longer had 
guaranteed revenues.50 
Hence, the Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act 
created the first impulse to reshape the Pennsylvania energy market.51 The new 
regulatory regime prompted changes in electric utility business policies and 
practices, e.g., changes in billing practices and metering, and “stranded benefits,” 
such as assistance to the low-income population, conservation programs, and 
consumer education.52 
B. Act 129 
Twelve years after enacting the Electricity Generation Customer Choice and 
Competition Act, the Pennsylvania legislature adopted Act 129 that created the 
Energy Efficiency and Conservation (EE&C) Program.53 The EE&C Program 
required electric public utilities with at least 100,000 customers to adopt the EE&C 
Plan, which was aimed at reducing energy consumption by at least 1 percent.54 
In addition to reducing energy consumption, the EE&C Plan had to be cost-
effective.55 To measure cost-effectiveness, Act 129 introduced the Total Resource 
Cost (TRC) test—a cost-benefit analysis determined by PA PUC.56 The test 
compared the net present value of financial resources spent over a 15-year period on 
supplying electricity with the net present value of the monetary cost of EE&C 
measures over the same 15-year life span.57 In simpler terms, the test compared 
whether it was cheaper to continue supplying electricity for the next 15 years or to 
install the EE&C measures that would save electricity. 
                                                          
50 Id. 
51 John Hanger, Pennsylvania’s Electric Restructuring: How the View Changed, PUB. UTIL. FORT., 
May 1997, at 22, 22 (calling the Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act “a historic 
statute that [would] introduce competition in the retail market among suppliers of electric generation”). 
52 Id. 
53 Energy Efficiency and Conservation (EE&C) Program, PA. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, 
http://www.puc.pa.gov/filing_resources/issues_laws_regulations/act_129_information/energy_ 
efficiency_and_conservation_ee_c_program.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
54 Id. 
55 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2806.1 (2008). 
56 Id. § 2806.1(c)(3). 
57 Id. § 2806.1(m). 
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In order to meet the TRC test, the EE&C measures should provide greater net 
present value than the value of the avoided cost for supplying electricity.58 
Consequently, the TRC test has been the main evaluator of the EE&C measures 
implemented by electric public utility companies.59 In addition, it has been widely 
used to estimate the cost-efficiency of any energy-related measure, including 
programs under the Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act.60 
C. Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act and Alternative Energy 
Credits 
In 2004, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Alternative Energy Portfolio 
Standards Act (AEPSA) “designed to promote conservation and environmental 
stewardship by reducing reliance on traditional sources of electric generation.”61 The 
purpose of the AEPSA was to diversify energy sources, by requiring that a certain 
amount of power that electric distribution and generation companies sell to their 
retail customers come from sources of renewable energy.62 Moreover, the AEPSA 
required that electric distribution companies (EDC) and electric generation sources 
(EGS) purchase a certain amount of solar photovoltaic power coming from solar 
alternative energy sources.63 For example, by 2020, EDC and EGS will be required 
to sell to their customers at least 0.5 percent of the energy that comes from solar 
photovoltaic technologies.64 
                                                          
58 Id. 
59 See Total Resource Cost Test, PA. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, http://www.puc.state.pa.us/ 
filing_resources/issues_laws_regulations/act_129_information/total_resource_cost_test.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2016). 
60 PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE ENERGY PORTFOLIO 
STANDARDS ACT OF 2004: STANDARDS FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF DEMAND SIDE MGMT. RES.—TECH. 
REFERENCE MANUAL 2013 UPDATE 2 (2012). 
61 Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Pennsylvania Sets Standards for New Program, 3740 PUR UTIL. REG. 
NEWS, Oct. 2005, at 5, 5. 
62 Zachary Brecheisen, Comment, Green Acres: How Bringing Pennsylvania Rural Electric 
Cooperatives Under the Full Provisions of the Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard Can Boost 
Renewable Energy Growth in Pennsylvania, 19 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 333, 339–44 (2011). 
63 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1648.3(b)(2) (2008); PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT IN 
SUPPORT OF PENNSYLVANIA SOLAR PROJECTS 5 (2010) [hereinafter POLICY STATEMENT SUPPORTING 
SOLAR PROJECTS]. 
64 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1648.3(b)(2). 
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The AEPSA is enforced through a system of Alternative Energy Credits (AEC) 
earned by EDC and EGS.65 PA PUC, entrusted with the enforcement of the 
AEPSA,66 has promulgated regulations that further develop the AEC system.67 A 
specially assigned AEC program administrator (Administrator) monitors EDCs and 
EGSs on the issue of their compliance with the AEC requirements.68 There are 
several ways in which EDCs and EGSs can earn these credits.69 The first and most 
obvious way is through producing or buying energy from solar photovoltaic 
technologies, where one credit is equal to one megawatt of electricity generated or 
purchased from an approved alternative energy source.70 Alternatively, EDC and 
EGS can buy AECs as a tradable instrument.71 This means that AECs can be traded 
without actually being tied to power purchase by EDC, similarly, for example, to 
trading in stock or bonds.72 Consequently, the AEC system creates an entire system 
of tradable instruments that can be bought or sold depending on whether an EDC (or 
EGS) underperformed or over-performed the Alternative Energy Standards.73 For 
example, if an EDC sold 0.6 percent of solar energy to its retail customers in 2020, 
it could sell the remaining 0.1 percent to a company that only sold 0.4 percent. 
The AEPSA originally gave the utility companies a two-year grace period from 
compliance with alternative energy portfolio standards, including solar energy 
requirements.74 In addition, the companies were exempt from compliance with the 
AEPSA during the “Cost-Recovery Period.”75 The Cost-Recovery Period essentially 
meant the period of time during which EDCs continued to incur costs relating to 
generation facilities, without yet having recovered such costs for various reasons.76 
                                                          
65 Id. § 1648.3(e)(1). 
66 Brecheisen, supra note 62, at 341. 
67 See 52 PA. CODE §§ 75.61–75.70 (2008). 
68 Id. § 75.64; 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1648.3(e)(2) (2008). 
69 52 PA. CODE §§ 75.61(a), 75.65 (2008) (allowing alternative compliance payments). 
70 POLICY STATEMENT SUPPORTING SOLAR PROJECTS, supra note 63; Brecheisen, supra note 62, 
at 341. 
71 52 PA. CODE § 75.61(a). 
72 Brecheisen, supra note 62, at 342. 
73 52 PA. CODE § 75.61(a). 
74 Brecheisen, supra note 62, at 343. 
75 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1648.3(d). 
76 Id. § 1648.2; see also 66 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2808, 2812 (2008). 
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Hence, Pennsylvania authorities gave EDCs an opportunity to recoup the costs spent 
on generation facilities. 
In addition to alternative energy portfolio standards, the AEPSA introduced net 
metering.77 Net metering enables connecting customer generators78 to the EDC grid 
and rotating the energy from the generator back to the grid.79 Customers can then sell 
the energy in excess of their needs back to the EDC.80 Under the AEPSA and 
subsequent regulation promulgated thereunder, EDCs were required to provide a net 
metering option to all their customers who wanted to connect their generators to the 
grid.81 Furthermore, EDCs were required to credit a customer-generator at the full 
retail rate.82 
Alternative energy and net metering came with a price, and Pennsylvania 
legislators were well aware of this.83 With regard to EDC’s expenses on generation 
or purchase of solar energy, the AEPSA allowed EDCs to recover “all reasonable 
costs”84 incurred in the process of purchasing or generating solar energy and then 
reselling the energy to its customers as a default service provider.85 Concerning the 
costs for small-scale solar projects incurred by residential customers and small 
businesses, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Alternative Energy Investment 
Act that provided funding to small businesses and residential customers willing to 
install solar panels through the Department of Environmental Protection.86 Finally, 
                                                          
77 Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 261, 286 (2005). 
78 For more discussion on the distributed generation, see infra Part III. 
79 Ferrey, supra note 77. 
80 Id. 
81 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1648.5 (2007); 52 PA. CODE § 75.13 (2016). 
82 52 PA. CODE § 75.13. 
83 POLICY STATEMENT SUPPORTING SOLAR PROJECTS, supra note 63 (discussing economic barriers 
to solar technologies). 
84 Reasonable costs usually mean the costs that are related to the service of EDCs’ customers, and 
that are prudent and just. POLICY STATEMENT SUPPORTING SOLAR PROJECTS, supra note 63, at 16. 
85 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1648.3(a)(3)(ii) (2007) (referring to 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2807(e)(3.9) 
(2008)) (“[A] default service provider shall have the right to recover on a full and current basis, pursuant 
to a reconcilable automatic adjustment clause under section 1307 (relating to sliding scale of rates; 
adjustments), all reasonable costs incurred under this section and a commission-approved competitive 
procurement plan.”). Because EDCs are natural monopolies with an obligation to serve customers of their 
service territory, they are default service providers and are legally obligated to procure energy sufficient 
to meet the demands of all their customers. 
86 Id. 
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for large-scale solar projects, Pennsylvania created funding through the Department 
of Community and Economic Development.87 
Unfortunately, the good intentions behind the AEPSA have failed to bring 
positive changes, especially when it comes to solar energy.88 First and foremost, the 
solar provisions of the AEPSA face strong obstacles due to their high cost.89 
Moreover, economic analysis of solar technologies yields uncertain results, which 
further chills the interests of investors in solar programs.90 And those programs that 
do exist in Pennsylvania create the effect of subsidizing the few owners of solar 
panels that can afford such technologies at the expense of those who cannot—low-
income citizens.91 
III. COST OF SOLAR FOR PENNSYLVANIA 
This Part will address the economic and social implications of solar energy. It 
will start by comparing the instances of successful implementation of solar in 
California, North Carolina, Arizona, and Nevada with the practices of other states. 
Then, it will focus on Pennsylvania solar policies and address the negative social 
implications of solar technologies in Pennsylvania. 
A. Solar Projects Nationwide 
Solar technologies have proved successful in a number of states. This success 
can be largely attributed to the relatively lower cost of solar energy or the relatively 
higher cost of fossil fuels.92 In such states, solar technologies, specifically utility-
scale solar generation facilities, can become the energy of the future.93 In other states, 
however, solar projects are mostly limited to distributed generation, which creates a 
series of negative externalities.94 
                                                          
87 Id. 
88 See infra Part III.B. 
89 POLICY STATEMENT SUPPORTING SOLAR PROJECTS, supra note 63. 
90 Id. 
91 See infra Part III.B. 
92 See Karen Henry, NREL Seeks to Determine Equation for Solar Market Success, ENERGY 
MANAGER TODAY (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.energymanagertoday.com/nrel-seeks-determine-
equation-solar-market-success-0107472/ (listing the amount of sunlight available for potential solar 
generation and the cost of competing grid electricity as key non-policy factors of determining the success 
of solar technologies). 
93 See the experience of California, North Carolina, and Arizona discussed in Part III.A.2 infra. 
94 See infra Part III.A.3. 
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1) Types of Solar Technologies 
The economic and social analysis of solar technologies is impossible without 
understanding the difference between utility-scale solar energy and rooftop 
distributed generation. Utility-scale solar energy is energy generated at power plants 
in the amount large enough to meet the needs of many customers.95 Distributed 
generation is small-scale solar energy generation, ordinarily installed by customers 
themselves to satisfy their personal energy needs.96 In many instances, however, the 
energy generated through distributed generation exceeds the needs of its owner, 
which gives such owner an opportunity to sell the energy through net metering.97 
The effectiveness of solar energy strategy often depends on the type of solar energy 
technologies used in each particular case.98 
2) Success of Solar Technologies in Certain States 
One of the U.S. leaders in solar technologies is, not surprisingly, California.99 
Specifically, California is breaking national records in the area of behind-the-meter 
rooftop solar technologies100 and utility-scale projects of 20 megawatts and above.101 
California lawmakers are also trying to create a comfortable environment for 
                                                          
95 Utility-Scale and Distributed Solar Energy Generation, OFF. OF INDIAN ENERGY & ECON. DEV., 
http://teeic.indianaffairs.gov/er/solar/restech/tech/index.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
96 Id.; Distributed Solar, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy/ 
distributed-solar (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
97 See supra Part II.C (explaining the notion of net metering). 
98 See James Conca, Which Is Cheaper—Rooftop Solar Or Utility-Scale Solar?, FORBES (July 30, 
2015, 6:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2015/07/30/which-is-cheaper-rooftop-solar-
or-utility-scale-solar/#2fb032a94f6d. 
99 Tam Hunt, California Is Getting Serious About Distributed Generation, GREENTECH MEDIA 
(June 17, 2015), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/california-is-getting-serious-about-
distributed-generation. 
100 Behind-the-meter rooftop solar technologies are solar panels that are not connected to utility 
grid and are not subject to net metering. Id. 
101 Hunt, supra note 99. 
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developing wholesale distributed generation,102 which is less popular than behind-
the-meter rooftop and utility-scale solar technologies.103 
North Carolina-based Duke Energy, which is the largest U.S. electric utility 
company, also heavily invests in solar panels.104 Similar to electric utility companies 
in California, Duke Energy prefers investing in utility-scale solar technologies that 
are more efficient than distributed generation due to the economy of scale.105 Several 
electric utility companies in Arizona have followed the example of California and 
North Carolina—Arizona Public Service and Tucson Electric Power are 
implementing utility-owned rooftop solar pilot programs.106 Utility-scale 
photovoltaic generation facilities also operate in Nevada.107 
3) Negative Effects of Solar in Other States 
Before trying to replicate the energy model of California or Arizona in other 
states, we must remember that these are states with two of the highest amounts of 
sunshine per year in the country.108 In other states, for example Wisconsin, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Idaho, or Maryland, states that receive less sun, electric utility 
companies are not willing to follow the California or Arizona path and invest in 
utility-scale solar generation facilities.109 Instead, they limit their programs to 
distributed generation, where their customers invest in solar technologies, while the 
utility companies only provide connection to the grid.110 
                                                          
102 Wholesale distributed generation is a kind of distributed generation systems that produces 
significantly larger amounts of electricity than rooftop distributed generation and sells this electricity on 
the wholesale market. See Wholesale Distributed Generation, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, 
http://www.seia.org/policy/renewable-energy-deployment/wholesale-distributed-generation (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2016). 
103 Hunt, supra note 99. 
104 Duke Energy Proposes Innovative Solar Programs for South Carolina, DUKE ENERGY (Feb. 10, 
2015), https://www.duke-energy.com/news/releases/2015021001.asp. 
105 Gavin Bade, Inside Duke Energy’s Renewables Strategy, UTIL. DIVE (June 22, 2015), http:// 
www.utilitydive.com/news/inside-duke-energys-renewables-strategy/401084/. 
106 Id. 
107 Profile Analysis—Nevada, https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=NV (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2016). 
108 Average Annual Sunshine by State, CURRENT RESULTS, https://www.currentresults.com/ 
Weather/US/average-annual-state-sunshine.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2016). 
109 Herman K. Trabish, The Fight Over Solar Moves From Net Metering to Rate Design, UTIL. 
DIVE (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-fight-over-solar-moves-from-net-metering-
to-rate-design/327742/. 
110 Id. 
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Unfortunately, notwithstanding its potential benefits, distributed generation 
may negatively impact electric utility companies and their customers.111 The key to 
understanding this phenomenon lies in the nature of the utility industry.112 
Specifically, electric utility companies receive their revenues from selling electricity 
within their service territory at a rate pre-approved by a state public utility 
commission.113 The rates are established during a ratemaking case, in the course of 
which a state public utility commission considers the capital costs that an electric 
utility company invested and projected operating costs the company will have to 
spend to serve all customers within the company’s service territory.114 Because 
electric utility companies cannot increase their rate outside the ratemaking process, 
they are sale-driven—the more electricity they sell, the more revenues they get.115 
When customers satisfy their own demands for electricity with distributed 
generation, this reduces the market share of electric utility companies, and 
consequently reduces their revenues.116 Even when distributed generation satisfies a 
portion of general demand, electric utilities companies’ costs cannot simply be 
reduced per capita of their customer market—the companies still have to invest the 
same funds in energy resources, because they are legally obligated to provide a 
reliable service within their service territory if the distributed generation fails.117 
When the electric utility companies’ revenues fall, they turn back to state public 
utility commissions to have their rates increased.118 State public utility commissions 
have to balance two evils—on one hand, they do not want electric utility rates to 
                                                          
111 Peter Kind, Disruptive Challenges: Financial Implications and Strategic Responses to a 
Changing Retail Electric Business, EDISON ELECTRIC INST. (Jan. 2013), http://www.eei.org/ourissues/ 
finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf. 
112 Id. 
113 Scott, supra note 28, at 264–65; see also Levine & Kendall, supra note 47. 
114 Scott, supra note 28, at 264–65. 
115 Id. 
116 Kind, supra note 111, at 1. 
117 Ashley Brown & Jillian Bunyan, Valuation of Distributed Solar: A Qualitative View, 27 
ELECTRICITY J. 27 (2014); David Schmitt, Net Metering: Getting Beyond the Controversy, http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/public_utility/netmetering_getting_beyond
__the__controversy.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). 
118 Levine & Kendall, supra note 47. 
 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XVI – Spring 2016 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2016.190 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
222 
skyrocket, while on the other hand, they need to make sure that the utility companies 
stay in business to serve their customers.119 
While electric utility companies can potentially increase the fee for providing 
connection to distributed generation, such an increase will affect the cost-efficiency 
of such alternative energy programs, and therefore reduce the company’s TRC 
ratio.120 Consequently, utility companies prefer recouping the loss in revenues 
through an increase in rates to all its customers.121 As a result, the customers that do 
not own a distributed generation facility absorb the cost for the customers that do.122 
B. Adverse Social Implications of Pennsylvania Solar Program 
Pennsylvania, which receives significantly less sun than California or Arizona, 
is a good example to test the hypothesis described in Part III.A.3. Currently, all seven 
Pennsylvania investor-owned EDCs have finished their cost recovery periods123 and 
have become subject to new alternative energy portfolio requirements.124 In 
particular, pursuant to the AEPSA requirements,125 Pennsylvania EDCs provide 
opportunities for distributed generation using solar energy resources. PPL Electric 
Utilities (PPL), PECO, Citizen Electric of Lewisburg, and UGI allow their customers 
to connect customer distributed generation technologies to utility distribution 
systems subject to fees.126 For example, PPL allows its customers to connect their 
solar hot water and solar (photovoltaic) generation systems to PPL distribution 
systems with an option to sell the produced electricity back to PPL through net 
                                                          
119 Alexander D. White, Compromise in Colorado: Solar Net Metering and the Case for 
“Renewable Avoided Cost,” 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1095, 1107 (2015) (“Commission must . . . set rates 
which protect both: (1) the right of a public utility company and its investors to earn a rate of return 
reasonably sufficient to maintain the utility’s financial integrity; and (2) the right of consumers to pay a 
rate which accurately reflects the cost of service rendered.”). 
120 Under Act 129, the costs of compliance with the AEPSA that are known and knowable to EDC 
must be included in the TRC Test calculation. Consequently, the increase in fees for distributed generation 
under the AEPSA increases the total costs of EE&C Measures under the TRC test and diminishes the 
utility chance of compliance with Act 129. PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 2016 TOTAL RES. COST (TRC) TEST, 
17 (2015). 
121 Kind, supra note 111, at 1. 
122 Id.; see also Trabish, supra note 109; Brown & Bunyan, supra note 117. 
123 For the definition of the term “cost recovery period” see supra Part II.C; see also 52 PA. CODE 
§§ 75.61–75.70 (2008); see also § 75.64.; 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1648.3(e)(2). 
124 Brecheisen, supra note 62, at 343. 
125 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1648.5. 
126 Herman K. Trabish, PPL, Peco Join List of Utilities Seeking Big Fixed Fee Hikes, UTIL. DIVE 
(Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/ppl-peco-join-list-of-utilities-seeking-big-fixed-fee-
hikes/383667/. 
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metering.127 UGI provides similar services to its customers:128 limiting net metering 
for residential services to 50 kilowatt (kW) and all other service locations to 
3,000kW. Similarly, Citizen Electric of Lewisburg allows connecting small solar 
photovoltaic projects to its distribution system subject to fees.129 
Pursuant to the AEPSA and PA PUC regulations, EDCs are allowed to recover 
the costs attributable to complying with the solar AEPSA requirements by using the 
non-bypassable Solar Photovoltaic Requirements Charge Rider (SPVRC Rider) as 
approved by the PA PUC.130 Since solar energy remains more expensive in 
Pennsylvania than fuel energy, it does not require a complicated mathematical 
analysis to establish that when EDCs include their costs for solar AECs into their 
rates, the rates go up.131 The analysis below will address the economic and social 
consequences of the Pennsylvania solar policy. 
1) Addressing Economic Evidence 
Solar technologies in Pennsylvania are predominantly limited to residential 
distributed generation.132 In particular, while customer distributed generation is 
getting more widespread in Pennsylvania, utility scale solar systems remain 
significantly less popular.133 And this is not surprising—a recent study conducted 
specifically for PA PUC established that utility-scale solar technologies are not 
                                                          
127 PPL Electric Utilities, Renewable Generation—Making the Connection, https://www.pplelectric 
.com/~/media/pplelectric/at%20your%20service/docs/customer-owned-generation/renewable 
energyoptions.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
128 UGI Utilities, Inc., Distributed Customer Generation Information (Mar. 25, 2009), https:// 
www.ugi.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2015Small-Generator-Interconnection-Process.pdf. 
129 Customer-Owned Small Generator Interconnection Requirements, CITIZENS’ ELECTRIC, 
https://www.citizenselectric.com/CustomerOwnedSmallGenerator.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). 
130 Edison Co., Pennsylvania Elec. Co., Pennsylvania Power Co. & W. Penn Power Co., Joint 
Petition of Metro. for Approval of Their Default Serv. Programs, 314 P.U.R.4th 365 (July 24, 2014); PPL 
Elec. Utilities Corp., Petition for Approval of A Default Serv. Program & Procurement Plan for the Period 
June 1, 2015 Through May 31, 2017, P-2014-2417907, 2015 WL 302144, at 5 (Jan. 15, 2015). 
131 Cf. Dan Haugen, Are Renewable Standards Driving Up Utility Rates?, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS 
(May 17, 2011), http://midwestenergynews.com/2011/05/17/are-renewable-standards-driving-up-utility-
rates/. 
132 Anya Litvak, Pa. Companies Shying Away From Solar Power, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 
Oct. 18, 2013, http://www.post-gazette.com/business/businessnews/2013/10/18/Pa-companies-shying-
away-from-solar-power/stories/201310180173. 
133 See Conergy, Epuron Complete 3 MW Solar PV Project in Pennsylvania, SOLAR INDUSTRY 
(Nov. 20, 2008), http://solarindustrymag.com/conergy-epuron-complete-3-mw-solar-pv-project-in-
pennsylvania (explaining that extensive research has yielded only one completed utility-scale solar 
project). 
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“cost-effective within the study horizon” to even further explore their nature and 
economics.134 However, the study determined that solar distributed generation is not 
equally cost-efficient when applied to residential, commercial and industrial 
sector.135 This conclusion is based on factors such as high solar distributed generation 
equipment costs and moderate to low avoided costs in Pennsylvania (resulting in 
minimum benefits for distributed generation technologies).136 The study concludes 
that, over time, costs for solar distributed generation may decline, but currently such 
technologies are not sufficiently cost-efficient to warrant any significant attention.137 
While other studies are more optimistic on the future of solar energy, none 
clearly addresses the ultimate issue—the cost-efficiency of solar technologies.138 For 
example, in 2009, the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy issued a 
255-page report on EE&C measures and renewable energy in Pennsylvania.139 The 
report failed to address the cost-efficiency of solar technologies, or even a projection 
of when and under what conditions such technologies will be cost-efficient.140 
Another study expressly admits that “solar energy projects are feasible only through 
the income generated through incentives,” meaning that solar can only work when 
subsidized.141 Finally, one study justifies the economic value of solar technologies 
to the number of jobs it creates;142 however, this number fades in comparison with 
$1.1 billion in state and local tax revenues generated and 140,000 jobs created by 
Marcellus Gas Development in Pennsylvania.143 
                                                          
134 PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION POTENTIAL STUDY FOR PENNSYLVANIA 
16 (2015), http://www.puc.pa.gov/pcdocs/1355000.pdf. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 41. 
137 Id. 
138 See, e.g., Richard Perez et al., The Value of Distributed Solar Electric Generation to New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania, CLEAN POWER RES. (Nov. 2012), http://mseia.net/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ 
MSEIA-Final-Benefits-of-Solar-Report-2012-11-01.pdf; Maggie Eldridge et al., Potential for Energy 
Efficiency, Demand Response, and Onsite Solar Energy in Pennsylvania, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-
EFFICIENT ECON. (Apr. 1, 2009), http://aceee.org/research-report/e093 [hereinafter ACEEE REPORT]; 
Steffen Lubbe & Joy A. Fritschle, The Potential of Utility-Scale Solar and Wind Energy in Chester 
County, Pennsylvania, 47 MIDDLE STATES GEOGRAPHER 79 (2014). 
139 ACEEE REPORT, supra note 138. 
140 Id. 
141 Lubbe & Fritschle, supra note 138, at 86. 
142 Perez et al., supra note 138, at 44–45. 
143 Timothy J. Considine et al., The Pennsylvania Marcellus Natural Gas Industry: Status, 
Economic Impacts and Future Potential, MARCELLUS SHALE COALITION iv (July 20, 2011), http:// 
marcelluscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Final-2011-PA-Marcellus-Economic-Impacts.pdf. 
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Therefore, one should treat numbers with great caution. Studies that propagate 
solar energy often sacrifice sound economic analysis and instead engage in 
demagogy. The studies advocating for solar energy encourage us to strive for solar 
energy despite its economic cost.144 The studies expressly call for subsidizing of solar 
technologies, but did not address potential negative effects of subsidies.145 Hence, 
one should not base its argument in support of solar on the theoretical benefits of 
solar energy without considering realistic shortcomings. The emphasis should be 
made on mechanisms that can work in practice considering social realities. The 
current Pennsylvania regulatory regime seems to have embarked upon some very 
unsafe grounds going against prudent scientific and economic evidence. 
2) Delineating Cross-Subsidizing 
Pennsylvania regulators continue to push for the development of solar 
technologies, despite their own scientific and economic conclusions.146 Pennsylvania 
EDCs have responded by petitioning for recovering costs spent on compliance with 
the AEPSA.147 For example, Pennsylvania EDC PECO successfully petitioned the 
PA PUC to recover costs associated with the procurement of AECs to comply with 
the AEPSA requirements (including the solar requirement).148 The costs recovered 
were then passed on to the PECO customers.149 PA PUC accepted PECO’s argument, 
stating that the cost recovery would be “in the public interest.”150 As a result of such 
process, customers that do not own solar technologies end up subsidizing those that 
installed the distributed generation. 
Recently, the PA PUC attempted to limit cross subsidizing of the solar 
technologies at the expense of non-solar customers and to prevent market distortions 
arising out of such cross subsidizing.151 Specifically, in its order, the PA PUC 
introduced a limit on net metering of customer distributed generation capacity to not 
                                                          
144 See, e.g., Lubbe & Fritschle, supra note 138, at 86. 
145 ACEEE REPORT, supra note 138. 
146 See, e.g., PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE ENERGY 
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS ACT OF 2004, at 5 (2014). 
147 Petition of PECO Energy Co. for Approval to Procure Tier II Alternative Energy Credits 
Through Indep. Brokers, ID178149, 2014 WL 1744784, at 7 (Pa. P.U.C. 2014). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, L-2014-2404361, Final Rulemaking Order (2016), http:// 
www.puc.pa.gov/pcdocs/1414766.doc [hereinafter NET METERING ORDER]. 
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more than 200% of the customer’s need.152 This means that the customer generating 
its own energy can now only sell up to 200% of its needs back to the utility through 
net metering.153 While the PA PUC acknowledged that the absence of any limits with 
regards to net metering “results in unjust and unreasonable rates paid by all other 
default service customers,” it still introduced a generous upper limit despite the 
recommendations of Pennsylvania EDCs.154 In particular, Pennsylvania EDCs 
pointed out that the 200% limitation would create additional costs for EDCs, “which 
in turn, would increase costs to electric customers” and result in “a higher level of 
cross subsidization whereby default service customers, who currently pay net 
metering cost as part of default service charges, would be required to pay an 
increased amount.”155 
The notion of negative externalities is one of the main concepts in any law and 
economics theory.156 Regrettably, the Pennsylvania legislature seems to have 
neglected to analyze the negative externalities of solar energy in Pennsylvania before 
it introduced its renewable energy policy. Although Pennsylvania regulators have 
finally introduced a limit on net metering, the 200% limit still means that the owners 
of distributed generation get 100% profit without paying anything for using the grid. 
Pennsylvania EDCs recognize this problem, but, being investor-owned companies, 
have little incentive to take remedial measures. Even they, however, have noted in 
their petitions to PA PUC that a high limit on net metering creates significant adverse 
effects on customers who do not own distributed generation.157 
3) Outlining the Burden Placed on Low-Income People 
In addition to the general issue of “free-riding,” distributed generation 
disproportionately affects low-income populations since, due to high cost of solar 
                                                          
152 Id. at 50. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 40–41, 51; Andrew Maykuth, PUC Votes to Set ‘Net-metering’ Limits on Customers 
Generating Electricity, PHILLY.COM (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/energy/ 
20160212_PUC_votes_to_set__net-metering__limits_on_customers_generating_electricity.html. 
155 NET METERING ORDER, supra note 151, at 41–42; see also PPL, Comments to Advance Notice 
of Final Rulemaking, No. L-2014-2404361, at 12–14; FirstEnergy, Comments to Advance Notice of Final 
Rulemaking, No. L-2014-2404361, at 2–3. 
156 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 211, 220–21 (2012) (referring to R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 1–16 (1960)). 
157 PPL Comments to Advance Notice of Final Rulemaking, supra note 155; FirstEnergy Comments 
to Advance Notice of Final Rulemaking, supra note 155. 
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panels,158 they cannot afford installation, but end up paying for the installations of 
others with the increase of utility charges.159 While the Alternative Energy 
Investment Act created the Emergency Energy Assistance Fund aimed at helping 
low-income population in case of unexpected weather conditions or high energy 
prices, even the name of the fund suggests that such assistance will be available in 
only extreme circumstances and it requires an action from the Governor of 
Pennsylvania.160 
Low-income populations are left with general energy program funding 
initiatives propagated by the Alternative Energy Investment Act, such as loans, 
grants, reimbursements, and rebates available for home owners and small 
businesses.161 In particular, the Act creates consumer and small business solar energy 
projects and authorizes Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA 
DEP) to provide further details for such projects.162 PA DEP acted on such 
authorization and promulgated Pennsylvania Sunshine Guidelines for the Residential 
and Small Business Solar Program,163 which describes the procedure and eligibility 
for consumers and small businesses to receive rebates for installing solar 
technologies.164 
As revised, the Guidelines provide rebates for consumers and small businesses 
to offset the cost of their solar installations upon the PA DEP approval.165 However, 
there are several reservations. First, applicants can receive rebates only when the 
funding is available; consequently, the approval of the project does not lead to 
automatic rebates.166 Second, residential applicants and small businesses must pay 
                                                          
158 The Future of the Electric Grid, MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE 112 (2011), http://energy.mit.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/MITEI-The-Future-of-the-Electric-Grid.pdf. 
159 See Kind, supra note 111, at 1. 
160 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1649.305. 
161 Id. §§ 1649.501–09. 
162 Id. § 1649.306. 
163 Department of Envtl. Prot. v. Cole, 52 A.3d 541, 543 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). 
164 PA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA SUNSHINE GUIDELINES FOR THE RESIDENTIAL AND 
SMALL BUSINESS SOLAR PROGRAM (2013), http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Energy/Office%20of%20Energy
%20and%20Technology/OETDPortalFiles/GrantsLoansTaxCredits/Solar/Pa%20Sunshine%20Guideline
s.pdf. 
165 Id. at 1. 
166 Id. 
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$100 and $150 non-refundable fee.167 As a result, even small businesses hesitate to 
install solar.168 Needless to say, a $100 fee, plus upfront installation costs, is an 
unbearable burden for the low-income population. Consequently, solar technologies 
are practically inaccessible to low-income people. Yet, lower income groups are 
sponsoring solar technologies for others. The adverse effects of solar initiatives on 
low-income people can create further negative consequences. For example, an 
increase in utility rates will result in a lack of ability of low-income people to pay 
for their bills, which in turn may result in increased burden on state social welfare 
system. 
4) Possible Solutions 
Although Pennsylvania solar policies have a series of negative social 
implications, this does not mean that Pennsylvania should totally abandon solar 
initiatives. Simply, Pennsylvania should not strive to be the front-runner.169 For 
example, PA PUC should consider the propositions of Pennsylvania EDCs to lower 
the upper limit of solar energy from distributed generation entitled to net metering.170 
Another solution to minimize cross subsidizing is to ensure the reliability of solar 
technologies.171 This can be achieved through developing quality assurance and 
inspection programs to “maximize system performance thru [sic] proper design, 
siting, and installation.”172 Reliability of solar technologies will allow electric utility 
companies to reduce their supply by the amount of the solar energy that is produced 
constantly and without interruption by customer distributed generation.173 In such a 
way, the companies’ costs will decrease, which will be reflected on all customers’ 
bills.174 
Another important technological aspect of solar technologies is energy storage 
and integrating energy storage programs into solar energy generation and 
                                                          
167 Id. at 2. 
168 Litvak, supra note 132. 
169 Pennsylvania has one of the largest solar mandates in the nation, requiring the installation of 
860 MW solar capacity over the next 15 years. Lubbe & Fritschle, supra note 138, at 79. 
170 See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion on limiting net metering. 
171 See, e.g., ACEEE REPORT, supra note 138, at 62. 
172 Id. 
173 See supra Part III.A.3 for the explanation of the problem that distributed generation decreases 
the revenues of electric utility companies, but does not reduce the costs the companies have to spend on 
their energy supply. 
174 For the explanation of the correlation of electric utility companies’ costs and customer utility 
rates, see supra Part III.A.3. 
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distribution.175 For example, there is currently “no successful utility-scale practical 
implementation of coordinated solar/storage and microgrid systems on a real-life 
distribution system in the U.S.”176 Energy storage and microgrids177 are also ignored 
by the Pennsylvania legislature.178 Since energy storage and the ability to operate 
solar energy generation in the microgrid environment directly affects the reliability 
of solar technologies, Pennsylvania rule-makers should dedicate more attention to 
this issue. 
Finally, measures should be taken to involve the low-income population in 
solar energy initiatives. The most obvious example is to offer cash flow upfront 
financing for solar installations and provide technical assistance during such 
installations.179 Consequently, it is not the end results that are flawed in Pennsylvania 
solar regime, but rather the means. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For the past several years, the Obama administration has become increasingly 
vocal with regards to the need to prevent global warming and abandon fossil fuels in 
favor of clean energy.180 And solar energy seems like the obvious first choice in 
furtherance of those goals. However, in the race for solar energy, state lawmakers 
should not sacrifice efficiency and welfare in favor of speedy results. Pennsylvania 
authorities made a mistake: by adopting one of the most aggressive solar initiatives 
in the country, they sacrificed hundreds of people who simply cannot afford solar 
technologies. Specifically, numerous reports and publications have suggested that 
Pennsylvania Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, including its solar 
requirement, create cross subsidizing of the owners of solar panels at the expense of 
all other energy consumers, distorting the energy market and increasing instances of 
                                                          
175 Elisa Wood, ComEd Microgrid Wins Grid Modernization Funding; DOE Boosts Solar, Energy 
Storage, MICROGRID KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 22, 2016), http://microgridknowledge.com/more-grid-
modernization-funding/. 
176 Id. 
177 Microgrids are “local power networks that use distributed energy resources and manage local 
energy supply and demand.” While typically connected with a national power grid, they have the ability 
“to pull themselves off the grid and function in island mode when necessary. . . .” Z. Ye et al., Facility 
Microgrids, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY iii (2005), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy05osti/ 
38019.pdf. 
178 For example, the term “microgrid” is mentioned only once in the entire energy regulation 
legislation in Pennsylvania. 
179 ACEEE REPORT, supra note 138, at 62. 
180 See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 2; State of the Union Address, supra note 3. 
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free-riding. The groups most affected are low-income populations. Pennsylvania can 
still, however, successfully pursue its solar initiatives subject to certain changes in 
its law and policy that address the negative effects of its current regime. 
